Theory and Hypotheses
We begin with the assumption that members desire reelection but also have goals of good public policy and power within the institution (Fenno 1973 ). We also assume that all members would prefer to serve in the majority party than in the minority party. Since it is the majority party that structures and controls the legislative process in the House, majority party members get policy outcomes closer to their ideal preferences than do minority party members (Sinclair 2002 ; but see Krehbiel 1998) . Membership in the majority party also gives incumbents significant fund-raising advantages with corporate and trade PACs (Cox and Magar 1999) , thereby helping to advance members' individual reelection goals. Thus, we expect contribution patterns to be responsive to the level of competition for majority control (see also Currinder 2003 and Kolodny and Dwyre 1998). As we will detail later, this responsiveness to competition will be especially important for members who have institutional positions that are more valuable to members of the majority party. An efficient redistribution of party campaign money-from financially flush members in safe seats to needy candidates in competitive contests-would benefit all party members by maximizing the party's chances of winning a House majority (Bianco 1999) . But the promise of majority party control by itself may be insufficient to induce members to share their campaign resources. First, incumbents are notoriously nervous about the amounts of money they believe they need to win their own reelections (Jacobson 1997) , and a member's surplus cash can be effectively employed to ward off challengers in future elections (Box-Steffensmeier 1996; Epstein and Zemsky 1995). "Losers," as Jacobson (1985-86) noted, "do not share the collective benefits of the party's victory." Second, if a member's party wins a party majority, that legislator can reap the collective benefits associated with majority control (more-desirable policy outcomes, better fundraising prospects) whether or not he or she contributed to the party's efforts. Thus, members would likely need selective incentivesexclusive benefits available only to members who contribute to the party's collective efforts-to motivate them to act in a way that serves the party (Olson 1965; Sandler 1992) .
The primary incentive that parties have to offer is leadership positions. There are several types of leadership positions-elected and appointed party offices, committee and subcommittee chairs, and so on-with varying levels of responsibility to the party caucus. We argue that the greater the position's level of responsibility to the caucus, the greater the probability that the member will redistribute campaign funds for the collective benefit of the party and its members (for a similar argument on leadership powers generally, see Rohde 1991, 166) . Additionally, the greater the responsibility, the more valuable that position is likely to be to the individual member, which should make it likely that those who hold it or aspire to hold it will comply with fund-raising expectations.
The shared expectations of responsibility between the party caucus and its officeholders is important to explaining how and why fundraising behavior has changed over time in the U.S. House and how it varies across different methods of making contributions. We hypothesize that fund-raising changes over time as party margins become closer and majority control is at stake. Members with the highest levels of collective responsibility, whose positions are most valuable when serving in the majority, should be most responsive to close party margins and should increase their contributions to others in order to maintain or capture majority status.
Members also have three different methods for making contributions: contributing to other candidates through their principal campaign account, contributing to their party's congressional campaign committee (CCC) through their principal campaign account, and contributing to other candidates through a leadership political action committee (LPAC).2 The methods members rely on are likely to tell us something about their goals and ambitions. Contributions to candidates, through a campaign account or an LPAC, allow the contributor to receive personal recognition by the recipient. That recipient, if elected, is then in a position to return the favor by voting for the contributor in party caucus for various positions. Thus, it is likely that contributions made through these methods are designed primarily to advance members' individual career ambitions, even if the indirect result also helps the party collectively. This motivation is especially likely within leadership PACs, as their name would imply.
Contributions to CCCs allow the party to target the money and do not allow a direct connection between the contributor and the ultimate candidate recipient. The contributor gives to the CCC to please the person(s) making the contribution request and to help the party achieve its goal of majority control. Those who contribute to CCCs, then, are likely to have some responsibility to the caucus or to party leaders.
In this section, we discuss one general set of hypotheses with two variations. Primarily we discuss which members are likely to redistribute their campaign funds to others. Our first variation on these hypotheses regards how the effect of the variable might differ over time in response to the competitiveness for majority control between the parties. The second variation on these hypotheses regards how a variable might have different effects on whether the contribution is made from a leadership PAC or from the member's campaign account to candidates or to CCCs. We summarize our expectations in Table 2 . (Fenno 1973) . Positions of power thus become a key resource in the party's arsenal of selective incentives. By creating well-endowed leadership positions and making them available only to members willing to serve the party's collective interests, parties harness members' individual power goals to achieve their own collective partisan ends. Biannual reselection to party posts and the greater value of majority over minority leadership positions ensure that members who occupy party leadership posts (and who desire reselection to them) continue to work for the party's collective electoral interests.3
The top elective party leadership positions are the most powerful party posts in each party's organization. Only a relatively small number of these party posts exist, making competition for each one fierce. Members who hold these positions are under pressure to meet members' expectations if they desire to remain in their posts or move up the leadership ladder. Those who fail to meet these expectations risk a challenge by an ambitious colleague who claims to be able to do better. If top leaders are expected by rank-and-file members to take the lead in serving the party's collective interests, as much of the literature on congressional parties emphasizes, then we should observe fund-raising behavior among the top leaders that aids the party collectively. This leadership behavior includes contributing to the party's candidates and to its congressional campaign committee, both of which advance the party goal of majority control. Thus, we expect a positive relationship between holding an elected party leadership position and all three types of redistribution activity.
Although the literature on congressional parties generally focuses on the top leadership positions as selective incentives, each party has an array of lower-level (mostly appointive) leadership positions designed to enlist broad involvement in leadership efforts (Rohde 1991; Sinclair 1983 Sinclair , 1995 . In return for their efforts, members who hold these posts gain a voice in leadership decision making, the prestige of having a leadership title, and a perch from which to compete for higher leadership posts (Canon 1989; Price 2000) . For several reasons, we expect party-directed fund-raising by members who occupy lower-level party posts. First, party leaders expect members holding these positions to be Redistributing Campaign Funds supportive of the leadership's efforts on behalf of the party (Rohde 1991; Sinclair 1983 Sinclair , 1995 (Wilcox 1990, 171-72) . Similarly, members who occupy lower-level party posts owe their positions to elected party leaders and thus are likely to be especially responsive to appeals to contribute to the CCCs. (Indeed, the member may have been appointed to the party's CCC.) Thus, we expect that occupying a lower-level party post will be positively associated with contributions from a member s principal campaign committee, particularly to the CCCs, but not with LPAC contributions.
In the contemporary Congress, party leaders have alwaysregardless of party margins-been expected to raise funds for individual party candidates (Baker 1989; Brown and Peabody 1992; Wilcox 1989 Wilcox , 1990 ). In doing so, leaders fulfill members' expectations that leaders help them individually (Sinclair 1983 (Sinclair , 1995 , while also helping to build the party's legislative numbers. Thus, we expect the effect of holding a party leadership post on contributing campaign money to individual candidates to be relatively stable across various levels ofparty margins. Yet, in terms of power, the value of a party leader's post is inextricably linked to the party's collective electoral fortunes. Thus, we hypothesize that contributions from party leaders to the congressional campaign committees should increase as party margins become smaller (and thus majority party control becomes at stake).
The parties also control numerous powerful committee positions that they can use to motivate responsible party behavior. Thus, we expect committee leaders and prestige committee members to redistribute more campaign funds than members without such posts, and the smaller the partisan margin, the larger the effect of holding a powerful committee post should be.
Each party also has numerous subcommittee positions to offer its members. We do not expect the same level of party fund-raising activity from subcommittee leaders as from committee leaders and prestige committee members. Our reasoning is straightforward: subcommittee leaders are chosen by partisan committee colleagues rather than by party leaders or through caucuswide votes. As Deering and Smith (1997) note, "[Their] accountability runs to committee colleagues rather than to the party caucus" (145). Although the value of subcommittee leaders' positions is linked to the party's electoral fortunes, the relative absence of caucuswide influence over who occupies these posts means that members who occupy them are likely to be judged on how well they serve the committee's, rather than the party's, goals. Subcommittee leaders' contributions are likely to go to individual members rather than to the party.
Members competing for a top party or committee leadership post also are likely to redistribute substantial sums. Wilcox 1989 Wilcox , 1990 ), whether or not majority party control is at stake. Although contributions alone probably are insufficient for winning a post, we expect members running in party or committee leadership contests to contribute more than members not running in such contests. Moreover, the importance of getting direct credit for one's contributions implies that running in a leadership race will be associated primarily with contributions to candidates (from both LPACs and members 'principal campaign committees) rather than contributions to the CCCs.
Members' Policy Goals and Party Voting
Members have policy goals in addition to their goals of reelection and power. One way to evaluate the effect of members' policy goals on contributions is to look at the effect of party voting. The logic behind a relationship between party loyalty and redistributing campaign funds is as follows. In the House, majority party control enables a party to structure and control the legislative process, thereby allowing the majority party greater success in passing its policy agenda. But within each party, the importance of these structural advantages to a member should depend on the extent to which a member supports the party's policy positions. Majority party control should be more important to members who typically support their party's positions than to members who typically defect from their party's positions. Thus, the more supportive members are of their party on the floor, the more campaign money they will redistribute.
Members' Capacity to Raise Surplus Funds
Members' reelection goals should also affect their willingness to redistribute campaign money. As Jacobson (1985-86) argues, no incumbent would aid the party's collective electoral fortunes if doing so would endanger his or her own reelection prospects. Furthermore, parties do not want incumbents who are facing serious electoral threats to redistribute their campaign funds since an incumbent who loses reelection risks the party's goal of majority control. Thus, the more electorally secure members are in their districts, the more money they will redistribute through their principal campaign committees. We do not expect a relationship between a member's electoral security and LPAC contributions because members cannot use LPAC funds for their own reelections.
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Members' capacity to raise surplus campaign funds-funds over and above what they need for their own reelections-should also be related to the sums of campaign money that they redistribute through their principal campaign accounts (although not through LPACs).5 Thus, we expect that the more campaign money with which a member begins the election cycle, the more campaign dollars that member will redistribute. Cash-on-hand also plays a particularly crucial role as a control variable in our model. Considering the fund-raising advantages that members in formal positions of power enjoy (Grier and Munger 1993), we think these members are likely to have larger campaign war chests than members without such posts. Including a cash-on-hand variable ensures that any relationship found between holding a leadership post and redistributing campaign funds is actually due to holding a leadership post, and not to the fund-raising advantages associated with holding a leadership position.
By affording members an advantage at raising money from corporate and trade PACs (Cox and Magar 1999), membership in the majority party provides incumbents with an increased capacity to raise surplus campaign funds. These advantages leave majority party members particularly well positioned to take advantage of the lessrestrictive regulations associated with contributions to the CCCs through their principal campaign accounts and contributions to candidates through LPACs. As a result, we expect that members of the majority party will tend to channel greater sums of campaign money through the CCC and LPACs, whereas members of the minority party will give more money directly to candidates from their principal campaign accounts.
Members' willingness to contribute to collective goals also is likely to be affected by campaign finance rules. In the 96th Congress (1979-80), Congress modified federal campaign-finance laws to prohibit retiring members from converting excess campaign funds into personal funds, but members of the 96th Congress "grandfathered" themselves from the prohibition. In 1989, Congress passed another law stating that after the 1992 elections, grandfathered members still serving in Congress would no longer be permitted to take advantage of the exemption (Fritz and Morris 1992, 83; Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994). Thus, through 1992, grandfathered members should be less likely than nongrandfathered members to redistribute campaign funds from their principal campaign accounts.
Redistributing Campaign Funds Partisan Margins
Finally, we suspect that party margins will have an impact on members' redistribution activity. As margins narrow, the top party leaders should apply increasing pressure on all members to be more generous in financially supporting the party and its candidates (Kolodny and Dwyre 1998). Members have good reasons to respond more generously, lest they fall out of favor with the leaders who can do much to influence their legislative careers. They also can be more easily persuaded that their contributions make a difference when margins are slim. Thus, in addition to the interactive effects we hypothesize between party margins and various leadership positions, we expect that party margins will have an additive effect on all three types of redistribution activity. In particular, the smaller the margin between the two House parties, the more campaign funds each member will redistribute to the party and its candidates.
Data and Measurement
We collected data on U. Contributions increased dramatically during the 1990s because nearly all members began chipping in, and they did so generously. Although raising money for party candidates and committees is seen as a leadership function-and leaders still generally redistribute the largest sums of campaign money-leaders' share of contributions declined over the decade. Other members of Congress are increasingly pulling their own weight. The role of the leadership now includes mobilizing other members to raise and contribute money, rather than singlehandedly doing the fund-raising chores on behalf of everyone else.
Multivariate Analysis
We present tobit analyses of the sums of contributions given by individual House members. Specifically, we analyzed three dependent variables corresponding to our descriptive analysis: (1) contributions from a member's campaign committee to House candidates, (2) contributions from a member's campaign committee to his or her party's congressional campaign committee, and (3) contributions from a member's leadership PAC to House candidates. We used tobit as the analytic technique because contributions are censored at 0 (Long 1997). We first present a pooled model of all contributions across the decade, with contributions adjusted for inflation. We then present an analysis of selected variables in each election cycle to analyze changes in contribution behavior over time in more detail. The -2xLLR statistics indicate that all models are significant at the .01 level.
A brief explanation of the tobit estimates and their interpretation is in order. As in Long 1997 (75-79, 209), the estimates in Table 3 represent the discrete change in Ey, the expected actual contributions by members when a specific independent variable xk changes from one value to another, holding all other x's constant.8 For a dichotomous independent variable xk, the change in xk is from 0 to 1, with the remaining dichotomous independent variables set at 0 and the continuous 613 Eric S. Heberlig and Bruce A. Larson independent variables held at their respective means.9 For a continuous independent variable xk, change inxkis a one-standard-deviation change centered around xk's mean, with the dichotomous independent variables set at 0 and the remaining continuous independent variables held at their respective means.
We hypothesized that a member's position in Congress would be related to contributions. The evidence in Table 3 Table 3 show that subcommittee leaders also give slightly more to other candidates (p < .10), although not to the CCCs and not through LPACs. Owing their responsibility to party caucuses on their committees (rather than to the full party caucus), subcommittee leaders appear to escape the fund-raising responsibilities that now apply to full committee leaders.
Members running for top party and committee leadership posts also contribute greater sums of campaign dollars to other candidates through their principal campaign committees and LPACs. Substantively, a change from 0 to 1 on Contestfor Position produces, on average, a $3,047 increase in campaign contributions to other candidates from a member's principal campaign committee and a bigger $14,541 increase in contributions to candidates from the member's PAC. (Of course, a member running for a leadership post may well give through both types of committees.) As expected, moreover, leadership aspirants do not give significantly more than other members to the party CCCs. Members vying for leadership positions clearly prefer to give directly to individual candidates, who-if they win-will be part of the electorate in the leadership contest.
Majority party control also affects contribution patterns. The evidence in Table 3 suggests that, as predicted, members of the majority party tend to route larger sums of contributions through the CCCs and LPACs, while members of the minority party give more money directly to candidates. Substantively, majority party membership has the biggest influence on LPAC contributions: majority party incumbents give an average of $7,675 more through LPACs than do members of the minority party. As noted earlier, majority party members have a greater capacity to raise money (Cox and Magar 1999) and can redistribute it through the venues with the least restrictive contribution limits. Majority status also confers the enhanced fund-raising ability necessary to market an LPAC successfully.
As expected, a member's support for party policy also influences contributions. In particular, the statistically significant estimates for Party Loyalty in all three equations indicate that the more that members support their party's majority on the House floor, the more campaign dollars they redistribute to other candidates and to the party's CCC. The Party Loyalty estimates are substantively modest, however: a one-standarddeviation increase in Party Loyalty centered around its mean produces an average increase of $629 in contributions from members' principal campaign committees to other candidates, $999 from members' campaign committees to the party CCCs, and $1,140 from members' LPACs to other candidates. A member's capacity to contribute also affects contribution behavior. The more campaign cash a member begins the election cycle with, the more that member gives to candidates and to the CCCs.?1 But even relatively large increases in cash-on-hand spur only limited generosity among incumbents. For example, the Cash-on-Hand estimate in the CCC equation indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in cash-on-hand centered around its mean-a change from $33,187 to $257,062-led to an average increase ofjust $2,283 in contributions to the party CCCs. Members involved in uncompetitive races are significantly more likely than members in competitive contests to contribute through their campaign accounts to other candidates, although not to the CCCs or through LPACs. As predicted, members exempted from ethics laws prohibiting the conversion of campaign funds for personal use upon retirement gave less to other candidates but no more or less to the party CCCs.
Redistributing Campaign Funds
In redistributing campaign funds, members also respond to the level of competitiveness for the control of the institution. Incumbents give significantly more money using all three methods as the seat margin between the parties declines (as indicated by the negative coefficients). For example, the Party Margin estimate in the CCC equation indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in Party Margin centered around its mean-a change from 34 to 68-led to an average decrease of $7,944 in contributions from members' principal campaign accounts to the party CCCs. This finding is consistent with our reasoning that party leaders will pressure members to be more generous as party margins tighten.
As predicted, moreover, the effect of several leadership variables on contributions is conditioned by party margins. When Party Margin is set at 34, for example, a change in the Party Leader variable from 0 to 1 produces a $77,582 increase in contributions from party leaders to the CCCs. By contrast, when Party Margin is set at 68, a change in Party Leader from 0 to 1 produces only a $20,059 increase in contributions from party leaders to the CCCs. We also found responsiveness to party margins in the committee system, although to a lesser degree. Committee leaders give more to the party CCCs as seat margins decline, a trend suggesting that the top party leaders have become a constituency for chairs desiring to hold their positions (Smith and Lawrence 1997). Prestige committee members also respond positively to declining seat margins, by giving more both to the party CCCs and to other candidates. Substantively the estimates for Prestige Committee are modest, however, relative to those for committee and, especially, party leaders.
Yet not all forms of leadership giving are conditioned by party margins. The top party leaders, as well as members in unelected party posts, appear to contribute slightly less campaign money from their campaign committees to other candidates when party margins are smaller than when they are larger. Moreover, LPAC contributions are not conditional on party margins for any leadership variable. Members in these posts, it seems, use LPAC contributions to solidify their hold on their positions, and they do so regardless of party margins.
Across the six election cycles, there are obvious differences in relationships between the independent variables and contributions. Our concern is with the positional variables of greatest theoretical interest. Table 4 presents the results for the majority party, elected party leaders, committee leaders, and prestige committee members for each election cycle. We ran the full models to estimate the results shown in Table 4 , excluding party margins (which are constant for each year), interactions, Note: * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.
